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THE JAMES GOOLD CUTLER TRUST
In 1926 the late James Goold Cutler, Esq.,
of Rochester, New York, established a trust
fund for the benefit of the College of William
and Mary in Virginia. Its purpose was to endow the John Marshall Professorship of Government and Citizenship in the Marshall-Wythe
School of Govemment and Citizenship; to provide certain prizes for student essays; and to
maintain a course of lectures on the . Constitution of the United States. One lecture is delivered annually by an eminent authority on
the subject. Mr. Cutler possessed an abiding
faith in the American constitutional system,
but felt that popular understanding of the
Constitution in all its phases is necessary for
its continuance.
Mr. Cutler was one of the few eminently
successful business men who took time from
his busy life to study constitutional government. As a result of his study, he recognized
with unusual clearness the magnitude of our
debt to the makers, interpreters and defenders
of the Constitution of the United States .
. He was deeply interested in the College of
William and Mary because he was a student of
history and knew what contributions were
made to the cause of constitutional govern-

[3]

ment by men who taught and studied hereWythe and Randolph, Jefferson and Marshall,
Monroe and Tyler, and a host of others who
made this country great. He, therefore, thought
it peculiarly fitting to endow a chair of governmen t here and to provide for a popular "lecture
each year by some outstanding authority on
the Constitution of the United States."
The seventh lecturer in the series was Honorable Newton Diehl Baker of Cleveland, Ohio,
Secretary of War under President Woodrow
Wilson, former member of the permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague, and an outstanding authority on the subject of Constitutional
law.
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THE MAKING AND KEEPING OF THE
CONSTITUTION
NEWTON DIEHL BAKER

Former Secretary of War
MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

Upon an old book plate which I used to see
very often, there was in Latin this advice, "If
you would trace the course of rivers, seek first
the fountains from which they spring"-sectari
rivulos petere fontes. I wonder how anyone
who is to speak on the Constitution could more
nearly "seek the fountain from which it springs"
than to come here to the halls of this ancient
college where many of the men who started
that Constitution on its eventful career were
educated.
The subject which has been selected for today
is "The Making and Keeping of the Constitution." It was no doubt a part of Mr. Cutler's
purpose that each speaker who came here should
say something about the Constitution itself.
Perhaps he was not exacting enough to expect
'any of us to say much that is new about so
venerable and debated a subject. Yet I am
persuaded that those who do come here to speak
need not despair of at least finding somebody
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to whom some of the things they wish to say are
unfamiliar.
Not in a complaining, but in a descriptive
spirit, may I say that in New York a few days
ago it occurred to me that I would like to have
a pamphlet copy of the Constitution to hold in
my hand today. I sent to the largest bookstores and some of the smaller bookstores in
New York to get such a copy. My messenger,
however, returned and told me that there were
no copies of the Constitution to be had in the
bookstores in New York. When one recalls
how genuinely the Constitution is the foundation
and repository of all of our personal rights and
all of our hopes for the continuance of free
government, he could well wish that every
household in America had on the center table
of the room in which the family most often
gathers, a copy of that document, and that its
famous phrases could be a part of the daily
reading and meditation of the people to whom
the keeping of that Constitution is entrusted.
Probably few of us, without refreshing our
recollection, realize how exceedingly brief a
document the Constitution in fact is. The
Preamble, which admittedly contains no distribution of governmental power, is a concise
and moving explanation of the purpose of the
founders in ordaining and establishing the Con[6]

stitution of the United States. This Preamble
is followed by seven articles. They define
and distribute the powers of the government
and prescribe the mechanics of its organization
and operation. Every part of the Constitution
indicates clearly that the government to be set
up is that of a federated state, and there are
many evidences of a consciousness on the part
of the makers that jealous and independent
sovereignties were pooling their common interests, while preserving their peculiar interests
for state and local control.
The first Article deals with legislative power.
It creates the Senate and House of Representatives, the method of selection of members, the
time and place of meeting; and Section 8 of
Article I enumerates under eighteen headings
the powers entrusted to Congress. Section 9
contains eight prohibitions upon Congress and
Section 10 three prohibitions upon the States.
The second Article has to do with the executive and after providing for the method of his
election, makes him the commander-in-chief
of the military forces of the Nation and generally imposes upon him the obligation to see
that the laws of the Nation are enforced.
The third Article deals with the judiciary.
It creates the Supreme Court and entrusts to
Congress from time to time the power to ordain
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and establish other courts inferior to the Supreme Court, to fix their jurisdiction except as
certain elements of jurisdiction are fixed in the
Article itself, and to fix compensation for judicial
servIce.
The fourth Article requires each State to afford full faith and credit to the public acts and
judicial proceedings of every other State and
enumerates the privileges of citizens travelling
from one State to another; gives Congress power
over territory and provides the method of erecting and admitting new States.
Article V deals with the subject of amendments to the Constitution, upon which I shall
have more to say in a moment.
Article VI imposes upon the new government
liability for the debts and engagements entered
into prior to the adoption of the Constitution;
declares the supremacy of the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made
under its authority; and prohibits any religious
test for the holding of any office or public trust
under the United States.
Article VII outlines the method of ratification
and proclaiming the Constitution, if and when
ratified.
The brevity of the Constitution is due in the
main to two causes. In the first place, it deals
with the structure of a government and avoids
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mere legislative enactments. It states principles and grants or withholds powers, but the
details of the application of those principles
and powers are left to be worked out and changed
from time to time. In the second place, the
men who wrote the Constitution were men who
wrote the English language and understood
what it meant. It is thus characteristically
spare and concise. I have not counted the
number of adjectives in the document, but I
should be very much surprised were I to discover upon counting that there are so many as
four.
The record of the Convention shows the sentiment of that body to have been against granting any power to the general government until
the need for it was clearly shown. Madison's
notes are full of discussions which seek to limit
proposed grants of power. Similarly debates
throughout the body of the country were characterized by anxiety lest words carelessly used
might be held to have contained grants of
power which the States were unwilling to give
to the central government.
Article VII of the Constitution provided that
the ratification of the conventions of nine states
should be sufficient to establish the Constitution
between the States so ratifying. Upon the
completion of the document, it was, therefore,
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submitted to the several States and in many of
them subjected to protracted discussion and
debate. Twelve of the thirteen States did
ratify. One State, Rhode Island, as you may
recall, did not ratify for two years and remained
for that time outside of the Union. To their
acts of ratification, however, many of the States
attached reservations and recommendations so
that in all there were one hundred thirty-three
such reservations to be considered by the first
Congress under the Constitution which was to
start the government in motion. When that
Congress met, James Madison, who more than
anybody else had guided the deliberations of
the Convention, proposed twelve amendments
as containing the substance of the one hundred
thirty-three reservations and resolutions transmitted with their acts of ratification by the
several States. These twelve amendments were
then submitted and ten of them adopted, always
thereafter known as the First Ten Amendments.
Perhaps the most common criticism of the
Constitution in these state-wide discussions
was the absence of a Bill of Rights, and the
reservation most often appearing in the ratifying acts aimed to make quite clear that the new
government was to be one of enumerated powers
and that all the powers not granted were reserved. Accordingly the amendment we now
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know as the tenth provides in terms, "The
powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." To those who had desired
a bill of rights in the Constitution, it had been
replied that no such bill was necessary in view
of the fact that the general government was to
have no powers except those expressly granted,
and that, therefore, none of the liberties and
immunities ordinarily contained in a bill of
rights needed to be expressed since there was
obviously no power delegated to the central
government which would prejudice such rights.
But this assurance was not enough. It was
entirely clear to the first Congress that ratification had been secured by a practical promise of
amendment to reassure whatever anxiety there
was upon this point.
Since the adoption of the First Ten Amendments, eleven more have been adopted. From
the beginning, more than three thousand proposals to amend the Constitution have been
suggested and submitted to the Congress. Of
that three thousand only twenty-seven have
been actually submitted to the States, and of
the twenty-seven so submitted, only twentyone have been adopted and one of those repeals
an earlier amendment. From this it is clear
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that we have regarded the Constitution as a
fundamental expression of the principle upon
which we desired our government to operate,
and that only under very unusual and special
circumstances have we been willing to modify
it. A rapid glance at the amendments which
have in fact been made is a further evidence of
the general attitude on this subject.
The eleventh Amendment was a popular
response to a decision of the Supreme Court
holding that a State could be made a party
defendant by citizens of another State. This
was deemed a denial of sovereign power by the
State of Georgia, the defendant in the suit in
question, and the judgment rendered against it
was never acknowledged or obeyed. The eleventh Amendment, therefore, remedied what was
regarded as a defect and denied the jurisdiction
for the future.
The twelfth Amendment had to do with the
manner of electing the President and VicePresident and grew out of a practical deadlock
occasioned by the inadequate provisions of
Section 3 of Article II of the original Constitution.
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
Amendments recorded the consequences of the
Civil War, dealing primarily with the abolition
of slavery and the political and economic rights
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of former slaves. The sixteenth Amendment
authorized the imposition of income taxes after
the Supreme Court of the United States had
several times reversed its own rulings upon their
validity. The seventeenth Amendment authorized the election of United States senators by
direct popular vote. The eighteenth Amendment established prohibition, the nineteenth
gave voting rights to women, and the twentieth
changed the date of the beginning of the terms
of elective Federal officers, executive and legislative. The twenty-first Amendment repealed
the eighteenth Amendment. An amendment
which, if adopted, would become the twentysecond Amendment, authorizes Congress to
regulate child labor. Only fifteen States have,
however, so far ratified, while by the provisions
of the Constitution itself, three-fourths of the
States must concur and submission to the States
requires the concurrent vote of two-thirds of
the two houses of the National Congress.
There are four ways by which the Constitution of the United States can be amended.
First, the formal submission of amendments
either to the State legislatures or to conventions
called in the States for the purpose. Second,
the Constitution makes it possible to call a
constitutional convention, the recommendations
of which must likewise be submitted for ratifi-
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cation. This process has never been tried.
In addition to these modes of amendment, however, there are two others. The first of these is
interpretation by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Through this channel have
come continuous amendments until it has been
sometimes said that to all intents and purposes,
the Supreme Court of the United States is an
adjourned session of the Constitutional Convention, sitting constantly to amend and modify
the Constitution as the necessities of our developing situation may require. By this I do
not mean that the Supreme Court of the United
States has ever consciously allowed its views of
public policy to persuade it to adopt a strained
interpretation of the language of the Constitution, but rather I do mean that with great wisdom and deeply impressed with the responsibility of its function, that great Court has revealed the adequacy of the language of the
Constitution to the developing civilization of
a growing people and prevented a mere dry
interpretation of words from being a restraint
upon the spirit of those who designed the Constitution to be the basis of a more perfect union
and an adequate assurance of justice and domestic tranquility in a great nation.
One other unwritten mode of amending the
Constitution is by disregarding it by unani-
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mous consent. We have experimented with
this several times with uniformly unfortunate
results. It seems to me to be the least desirable
of all the modes of amendment, though it is
perhaps an application of a thoroughly AngloSaxon principle to institutional development.
I am sure that this audience all know that
Gladstone once said that "the American Constitution was the most wonderful work ever struck
off at one time by the brain and purpose of man."
That much of Mr. Gladstone's statement we
are fond of quoting. What he really said, however, was, "As the British Constitution is the
grea test organization that has ever proceeded
from progressive history, so the American
Constitution is the most wonderful work ever
struck off at one time by the brain and purpose
of man."
The American and the British Constitution
are two entirely different things. One is a
series of great principles sometimes embodied
in documents, beginning perhaps with the
Magna Carta, and including parliamentary
acts, like the Act of Settlement, evolved in
revolutionary and dynastic crises in the life of
England, but also involving traditional attitudes of mind which have grown up as unconscious predicates in the political thinking of a
determined but biologically conservative peo-
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pIe. There is, of course, no such instrument as
the British Constitution. When a bill is under
debate in parliament, nobody can point by
article and section to a fundamental law as
showing the act to be within or without parliamentary power, but somebody is quite sure to
arise and he may be a country squire, a college
professor, or one of the lords-law, lay, or
clerical-and say, "The bill is unconstitutional."
When challenged for his reason, he will say,
"Well, it does not seem to me to be British."
So far as a people universally have that kind of
instinctive feeling about the fundamental law
of their society, it may be that an unwritten
constitution is better than a written one, or at
least as good. Certainly this is true about the
British Constitution, that under it, without
strain and without difficulty, there have taken
place incidents and episodes which created no
crisis and aroused no feeling of violent antagonism and yet have in themselves marked institutional advances which would have been unthinkable to the ancestors of the men who enacted them. One such incident in our own day
is strikingly illustrative of this possibility. Not
long ago a dozen gentlemen sat around a table
in London and decided that the British Empire
had already become a federation of self-governing democracies. They, therefore, announced
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their conclusion when the meeting was over and
without a vote of any kind, either popular or
legislative, the imperial pretensions with which
Disraeli aroused the imagination of Queen Victoria and her subjects gave way to the more
modern and, I think, the nobler conception of
self-governing constituencies uniting their external interests for administration by a central
government. This was an instance of the operation of progressive history, but it makes a
striking contrast to our own experience.
In the two countries the processes have been
exactly the reverse of each other. Great Britain
started with an empire governing her colonies
from Westminster. She grew into a federation
in which the right of self-government was
claimed by and accorded to her colonies. We
started with thirteen independent sovereignties
making very jealously guarded grants of right
to a central government, and our growth has
been in the direction of the absorption of the
rights of the States by the Federal Government
until one of our noted constitutional writers has
described the process in a book entitled The
Vanishing Power of the States. In other words,
Great Britain's development has been in the
direction of dispersing power: ours has been in
the direction of centralizing power.
The theory upon which our Constitution has
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proceeded has been that all power is derived
from the people; that the people delegate just
so much of their power as they desire to the
Government, which is their creature; and it is
obvious that both the makers of the Constitution and its earlier interpreters sought to restrain any tendency toward centralization both
by the severe requirements for amendment, and
by the erection of the judiciary into a disinterested final conservator of the limits both of
power and action imposed by the Constitution
on the central government.
May I now turn from this hasty view of the
mechanics and theory of the Constitution to say
a word or two about the making of it.
Weare rather disposed, I think, to imagine
that the Constitutional Convention of 1787
more or less evolved the document it submitted
out of thin air, or at least out of philosophical
specula tions of an untried and theoretical sort.
Of course, that is just not true. The colonial
governments in America in the first place had
had large experience in the matter of self-government. They had had a long period during
which they were tugging against the restraints
imposed by royal governors, and in no place is
that history more centered than in the very spot
where we now are. England in those days was
a long distance from America. The British
[ 18 ]

Parliament was a remote institution concerned
primarily with British interests, and it was easy
to imagine it with defective knowledge of American conditions. There had grown up in America
a race of men who were political figures at home,
planters for the most part, with leisure which
they had the culture to spend in reading and
meditation. These men on the banks of the
James and of the Potomac, or in the capitals
and county seats of New England, delighted to
inform themselves in political theory. There
were not many books in those days and all of
these scholarly men read the same books and so
had an identity of speculative background and
more or less an identity of information about
political experiments described in history. In
other words, they were a highly specialized and
educated class and their intimate talk had to do
with theories and experiments in government.
It used to be said, no doubt with truth, that
Thomas Jefferson had at Monticello in the
drawer of a desk, a hundred written constitutions of democracies, all of which had failed.
Surely one of the great merits of Jefferson, one
of his outstanding contributions to our political
experiment, lies in the fact that in spite of one
hundred failures, he still had the faith to believe
that a democracy was a possible thing-that it
could succeed. If there was about him at
[ 19 ]

that time and in the air of America, grave doubt
on that subject, there was warrant for such
doubt, for the history of the world up to the time
of the declaration of independence showed
many brave attempts at democracy, all of
which gave way readily to dictatorships, which
in turn were succeeded by privileged classes
under some form of monarchical organization.
When the Constitutional Convention met in
1787, the great bulk of its members were these
trained political philosophers, but their colonial
experience with local self-government made
them practical men. There was little disposition on their part to jump off of the planet
and yield to the lure of untried but attractive
theories. In addition to that, they had before
them the experience of the United States in the
so-called "critical period" between the Declaration of Independence and 1787, when a feeble
and loosely organized central government existed without a chief executive and the country
had gone from one disaster to another. The
principle of the Articles of Confederation may be
said to have been the creation of a central government which should have power to act only
to the extent that it could secure the voluntary
cooperation of the States. By the time the
Convention met there were no people left who
believed that a great nation, or any nation,
[ 20]

could exist in America unless the central government were given supreme power in purely
national concerns.
Probably rarely has there gotten together
a group of men so prepared to discuss political
issues of the first order as at our Constitutional
Convention. It was not a large body, but it
was a picked body. George Washington presided over it and Virginia contributed in addition to that first character in the Nation, James
Madison, called the "Father of the Constitution," and others of her great sons. Washington's contribution was one of character and
common sense, but around him on every hand
were the finest political intellects to be found in
the country and the debates as recorded by
Madison were always earnest, often threatened
complete failure of the undertaking, and were
finally brought into harmony chiefly by the
domination of Washington's character and the
profound and conciliatory worldly wisdom of
Benjamin Franklin.
I do not know any book to compare with
The Federalist. Most of its papers were written
by Hamilton. Jay and Madison contributed
those which he did not write. In their original
form, these were papers or essays printed in
such newspapers as there were and distributed
in pamphlet form. As a book they make up
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four hundred pages of ordinary print, which
educated people in our day find it difficult to
read,-it is so compact, so concise and direct in
its arguments; it is so weighted with historical
references and detailed in its analyses that it
makes what we modern people, with our radio
minds, call "hard reading." But we must
remember that these papers were addressed to
the people of the United States and were understood by them, a fact which shows that they
were a great people. Indeed, I imagine that a
great literature may be defined as great books
written by great men, addressed to the interest
of great people who are prepared to understand
them. The audience is as much as the author
in the making of a great book. The plays of
Sophocles could never have been written but
for the existence of the people of Athens, nor
could Shakespeare's plays have survived their
author but for the fact that he merely recorded
the thoughts and emotions of a highly imaginative and daring people, who were building
with rough hands a great civilization upon
founda tions of sound emotion and character.
So if we turn the cart around the other way, I
think we are obliged to ascribe the greatness
of the Constitution and of its literary and argumentative defense to the fact that the people of
the United States in 1787 were a highly developed and highly educated political people.
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The Constitution was then a crystallization
of the experience and wisdom of a people accustomed to political thinking-a people also
living through the disheartening experience of a
government structurally incapable of effective
functioning. When the new Constitution was
tendered, it was accepted by the people as an
expression of their best hope and of their highest
purposes.
We come now to another question suggested
by the title of this address. The Constitution
having been made and having grown as it has,
how can we, the successors and political heirs
of the architects and interpreters of the Constitution, best preserve it.
If any analogy is to be drawn from the way
in which the Constitution was made, it would
seem that the keeping of the Constitution would
also depend upon our having two qualifications.
In the first place there will have to be dedicated
to the Constitution the devotion of the highest
trained intellects and consciences of the Nation. By these, of course, I mean those whose
historical perspective will assure them against
short-range thinking- men who know the experience of the race in its institutional struggle
toward liberty and will not be tempted to yield
for today's expediency the permanent immuni-
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ties and guarantees of the future. Second, and
quite equally indispensable, there will have to
be a broad and sympathetic appreciation
throughout the people of the United States of
what the Constitution is and what it means
and what its value is to them and to posterity.
With that thought in mind, I turn just a moment to the part of this audience made up of
young men and young women who are students
in this College.
You boys and girls are going to face demands
of all sorts for constitutional change. There will
be pressed upon you suggestions of convenience
and social amelioration, attractive in themselves and especially attractive to the mind of
youth, which is spontaneously generous in its
responses. Unless you have traced the river
of the Constitution to the springs from which it
arises, unless you know what the Constitution is
and why it may be said to have mothered the
greatness of this great Democracy, unless you
know the failures and the cause of the failure of
other attempts to operate constitutional government, your judgments will necessarily be
infirm in the face of such appeals. This then
is a challenge to you to be prepared, and preparation lies not only in being generous and sympathetic, but in disciplining those fine emotions
into the possibility of practical achievement by
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subjecting them to the restraints of a wisdom
born only of knowledge and experience.
Now let us look at the Constitution for a
moment from another point of view. The
Philadelphia Convention was not a harmonious
body. There were wide differences of feeling
among the colonists and these were reflected
by their representatives in Philadelphia. In
the body of the Constitution there are evidences
of the compromises which were necessary to
harmonize these difficulties. As a matter of
fact, throughout the meetings of the Constitutional Convention and almost up to its final
adjournment, the opinion prevailed in the body
and outside that agreement was substantially
impossible. Letters from the statesmen of the
period, which have been preserved, to their
friends indicate almost despair. Most of the
members of the Convention were relatively
young men. I suppose in the language of today
that body may be regarded as our first "Brain
Trust." But there was present a man more
than eighty years of age who sat sagely through
the disputes and controversies of his younger
associates, and every now and then, with some
captivating bit of humor or, in very grave controversies, with a sentence of solemn prayer,
called them back to the business in hand. In
the heat of one of these controversies, Benjamin
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Franklin said, "Gentlemen, we were sent here
to confer, not to contest with one another."
Resorting to everything from gentle scolding
to patting and praying, Franklin on the floor
and Washington in the chair held the Convention together until the Constitution issued.
Some of the compromises of the Constitution
are interesting both historically and because of
their consequences. One of these which especially interests me is the sort of joint guardianship of the Nation's foreign relations entrusted
to the Executive and Senate. If I were in the
Congress, I think I would introduce Amendment No. 3001, leaving the initiative of the
treaty-making power to the President a"nd requiring the ratification of treaties by a majority
vote of the two houses rather than the twothirds vote of the Senate as the Constitution now has it.
In this modern world where war is just around
the corner and just over the hill top, every thing
happens with lightning speed. There is left
for nations no moment of meditation. The
action of every agent is instantly subjected to
the emotional judgment of the people. As a
matter of fact, the thought which I am thinking
now, if it should be transferred to China, would,
as a mere matter of calendar and clo<;k time, get
there about a day before I say it or think it.
[ 261

The world is so linked together that we think
simultaneously and if we are provoked, we are
all provoked at the same time. Indignation
does not spread slowly, but its causes wave over
us and engulfus all at one time. The atmosphere of the modern world has become explosive
and the slow-gaited machinery which was quite
adequate in the more reposeful days of the beginnings of the Republic, is quite inadequate now
to deal with th~ tempests of national feeling
which are fanning international discords into
international conflagrations. There are two
reasons, and only two, that I have ever been
able tp discover for the present allocation of
power on this subject in the Constitution. The
members of the Convention realized that a
certain secrecy, or at least confidential character, was necessary in the preliminary discussions of international questions, and as there
were to be but twenty-six senators, the Convention assumed that twenty-six men could keep
a secret so that it would be safe for the President
to advise with the Senate while national issues
and interests were being assessed as they might
be affected by one course or another in a prospective treaty. Whether or not the Convention was right in assuming that twenty-six men
could keep a secret, it is not now important to
consider. ,The number of senators is now
[ 27]

ninety-six, and among that number it is quite
impossible to hope for a universal prevalence of
restraint and reserve. Indeed, in quite recent
times it has seemed permissible to the Chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to parallel the President's initiative in
foreign affairs by himself undertaking to express
to foreign representatives his views upon such
questions, whether they were at variance with
that of the Executive or not. I do not see how
any foreign ambassador in Washington, who
wants to negotiate a treaty with the United
States, can make up his mind whether he ought
to begin his conversations with the Secretary
of State or the Chairman of the Senate Committee.
The other reason was that in Colonial times
there were certain issues deemed of great importance by sections of the country but of
relatively little prospective importance in other
sections. The people of New England were
exceedingly concerned that their fishermen
should have access to the waters to the north.
Here in the South, and a little farther west and
south of us, the people had little concern about
fishing rights, but they were quite sure that the
expansion and growth of this new country was
conditioned by the right of unrestricted navigation of the Mississippi with outlets into the Gulf
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of Mexico. Virginia particularly, owning land
extending almost indefinitely to the west, was
unwilling to have any power given to the Federal Government which would make it possible
to barter away the right of navigating the Mississippi for the purpose of securing fishing rights
in the northern waters for the people in New
England. In all sections of the country there
was a fear lest the new government might be
tempted by sectional interests to prefer one
section to the other, and the two-thirds rule
was obviously intended to make it impossible
for any section of the country which could not
muster more than a bare majority of the senators to prefer northern fisheries to Mississippi
navigation, or indeed to effect any settlement
with one of our international neighbors prejudicial to some other ,section of the country.
Now in the long after years, New England's
hearty fishermen explore the northern fisheries
in serene security from any international restraint, and the commerce of the greatest
Nation in the world rides unvexed upon the
flood of the Mississippi to the sea, but this
compromise is still with us, maiming our power
and handicapping us to deal as a modern nation in our international relations. The simple
question of the adhesion of the United States
to the World Court, a court the establishment of
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which is distinctly the contribution of an idea
to international development by America, a
court which is one of the dignified and conspicuous elements in the machinery which a stricken
world set up after the devastating World War
to preserve international peace, that question is
delayed over a dozen years by the unwillingness
of the Senate to act upon it. And this inaction
is the more noteworthy when it is recalled that
every Secretary of State and every President of
the United States from the days of Theodore
Roosevelt until now has ardently urged either
that the United States take the lead in the establishment of such a court, or adhere to it after it
had in fact been established.
The time runs and this address will soon exceed the proper limits of the occasion, yet I do
wish to say a word about the wisdom of keeping the Constitution.
When the Constitution was first proposed,
the debates had very largely to do with revenue
and the rights of the States inside the Union.
Hamilton's papers in the Federalist enlarge upon
the advantage of a strong general government to
make common cause for us all in dealing with the
rest of the world. A more perfect union would
enable us to defend our rights from a military
point of view, and the national credit would be
an element both of military and commercial
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strength. In these days of emotional approach,
it is not uncommon for men who have not read
and thought much about the Constitution to
describe it as a document adopted by property
owners for the defense of property. Thoughtless
and inflamed speakers and writers permit themselves to point out that members of the Convention were themselves large owners of property
and to draw from that fact the unwarranted
deduction that the greatest patriots in America,
who had nearly all of them exposed their lives
in the assertion of the country's freedom, immediately became a lot of conspirators, quieting
their consciences for the protection of their
purses. In the light of history, that is perfectly
untrue. It is true that the members of the
Convention had the capacity and willingness
to pay their debts. They were people of financial responsibility, but nobody can read
Madison's debates without realizing 'that what
George Washington said of the Convention was
true and that what John Adams said of it was
true. Both praised the integrity of the members of the body, and John Adams said of the
Constitution that it was "a document produced ...--/
by sound heads inspired by sound hearts."
I venture to believe that the idea that there is
some difference between personal rights and
property rights is the product of unclear think[ 31 ]

ing. Property has no rights. Persons have
rights with regard to property. There is no
higher liberty than that a person should have
the right to enjoy property that results from his
efforts. Liberty to enjoy the fruits of one's
labors takes the form of a property right, but
it will be clearer if we say that it takes the form
of a personal right with regard to property.
It clouds the issue and obscures discussion to set
up an imaginary opposition between rights of
property and rights of persons. That there
should be limitations upon the rights of persons both with regard to other persons and with
regard to property is too clear for debate, but the
Constitution does not permit us to be blind to
the fact that when we take property from one
man and give it to another by legislative enactment, we are not preferring the personal right
of .the recipient to the property right of the
person from whom it is taken. In both instances we are dealing with the rights of persons as to property. Indeed, I am persuaded
that in the one hundred and fifty years of our
experience under the Constitution, a very substantial part of the service rendered to us by the
Supreme Court of the United States has lain in
its protection of the right to the pursuit of
happiness and the vigor with which it has maintained our personal and business ethical obliga-
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tions, showing the identity of the conduct dictated by honor with that required by constitutional principle.
Amendments to the Constitution have been
relatively few, some of them perhaps not wholly
wise. For instance, I am myself not entirely
clear that it would not have been better to leave
the election of United States senators to the
State legislature. I realize that there may well
be earnest difference of opinion about this. I
do not think the answer to the question is found
by merely attempting to compare the distinction of individual members of the Senate selected by one or the other of these processes.
The fact is that the democratic principle is subject to two forms of attack. First, a frank
denial of its validity. That attack we can always meet both on principle and with the lessons of experience. The second attack, however, is more subtle. It consists in overloading
the operation of the principle until its back is
broken by the imposition of tasks greater
than can be borne. The principle is entirely
satisfied by the complete control of ultimate
power in the people. If, however, the people
are called upon ceaselessly to perform directly
the detailed tasks of operation, the burden becomes too great and the response by the people
will necessarily be uninformed and ineffective.
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In the great cItIes of this country, the voter
faces such a multitude of candidates for such
a multitude of offices that the task of selection
is an impossible burden. Chance, impulse,
and the suggestiveness of the names of candidates become the only canons of choice. The
voter may enter the booth with a sense of
democratic power, but if he is honest, he
emerges with a conviction of democratic defeat.
We have lived to a time when the world is
troubling itself about other forms of government. When the World War was over, ancient and traditional forms of government were
not only in disrepute, but in a state of collapse.
Independent and restless peoples everywhere
suddenly realized that they were free. They
called constitutional conventions imitating our
model. They made bills of rights, distributions
of powers, and imagined that that was the end
of the old era and the easy and safe beginning of
a new one. One after another, these new governments failed, and they failed, of course,
because the constitutions they had adopted
were not the product of their progressive history. They were not the crystallizations of
their own experience. They had had no experience in operating institutions of that sort, and
when the multiplying natural difficulties of
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operating democratic forms were undertaken by
inexperienced people, they soon found themselves adrift at sea, with the result that they
called in the Lenins, Hitlers, and Mussolinis
to undertake by dictatorial processes the tasks
which their unaccustomed hands found it impossible to do. With this the democratic
principle began to come into disrepute and there
grew up attacks upon it-on the one side by the
Fascist theory and on the other side by the
Communist theory. The adherents of both of
these united only in defaming the principle of
democracy. In the United States six months
ago there was more uncertainty than there is
today as to the pretensions of these alien theories
in their competition for the favor which we
have always hitherto given to democracy.
That uncertainty is being dissipated. Democracy is distinctly regaining its ascendency
in the trained intellect of the world. Even in
the countries in which these new and unusual
forms have been resorted to, there are evidences
of a fresh desire to revert to the democratic
process. I doubt whether anybody in Russifl.
really believes that the Communistic State will
be the ultimate form of government there.
I doubt very much whether anybody in Italy
or Germany believes that Fascism or Hitlerism
will be the final product of the political turmoil
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through which those great countries have passed.
In other words, these new forms and fashions
attracted for a little while, but their output in
human satisfactions has been disappointing to
the point of disaster.
Meantime the English-speaking nations of the
world, longest trained in the democratic process, have had their troubles too, but the virtue
of democracy is that it permits the digestion of
experience and unrevolutionary modifications
of institutions so long as they are dictated by
an informed public opinion.
In the midst of a world filled with political
speculation, and in an atmosphere of depression which has tried the faith of men in all
human institutions, democracy has remained
steadfast. This does not mean that any of the
great democracies of the world like ours or
that of the British is to stop growing. It does
not mean that tomorrow is not to be better
than today, but it seems to me that it does
mean that the process by which we have grown
from our small constitutional beginnings is
demonstrated to be the wise and fruitful method
of growing, and that our written Constitution,
understood by and believed in by our people,
evoking their loyalty and their love, and defended by their intelligence, is the best assurance of an increasing happiness and well-being.
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That kind of loyalty to the Constitution is the
best hope man has yet evolved of an orderly
government under which liberty shall remain
possible.
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